1 2 3	STATE OF NEW MEXICO ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS OFFICE TAX ADMINISTRATION ACT	
4 5 6 7	IN THE MATTER OF THE PROTEST OF MICHAEL CORWIN TO ASSESSMENT ISSUED UNDER LETTER ID NO. L0072396592	
8	AND	
9 10 11 12	IN THE MATTER OF THE PROTEST OF CORWIN RESEARCH & INVESTIGATIONS LLC TO ASSESSMENTS ISSUED UNDER LETTERS ID NOs. L2142842160 and L0593455664	
13 14	v. AHO Case #18.11-287A D&O #19-14	
15	NEW MEXICO TAXATION AND REVENUE DEPARTMENT	
16	DECISION AND ORDER	
17	A hearing in the above-captioned protest occurred on March 27, 2019, before Chris Romero,	
18	Esq., Hearing Officer, in Santa Fe, New Mexico. Mr. Michael Corwin appeared representing himself	
19	("Taxpayer"). Staff Attorney, Mr. David Mittle, Esq., appeared representing the Taxation and	
20	Revenue Department of the State of New Mexico ("Department") and was accompanied by Ms.	
21	Mary Griego, protest auditor. Protest auditor, Ms. Angelica Rodriguez, was also present to observe	
22	for training purposes.	
23	Department Exhibits $A-C$, and E , and Taxpayer Exhibits $1-17$ were admitted. Based on	
24	the evidence and arguments presented, the Hearing Officer finds that Taxpayer's protest should be	
25	DENIED because Taxpayer has not demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence that he is entitled	
26	to protest any assessments or notices which were issued more than 90 days prior to his formal written	
27	protest, mailed to the Department on September 21, 2018. With regard for any assessments which	
28	the protest should be deemed timely, those assessments were either abated prior to the hearing, or	
29	negated by subsequent amended returns.	

After receiving an automatic reply that Mr. Montalvo was no longer employed with

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Taxpayer had no further post-assessment communications with Ms. Marquez.

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DISCUSSION

Although Taxpayer presents assorted issues for consideration, the central component in the protest reduces to whether Taxpayer's formal written protest, particularly in reference to the assessments against Corwin Research & Investigations, LLC, is timely. The Department fully abated the assessment in reference to Taxpayer in his personal capacity and although there are issues underlying that assessment which Taxpayer might continue to disagree, it was undisputed at the hearing that he has no present liability under that fully-abated assessment.

The same is true for all other assessments contained in Taxpayer Exhibit 1, except those assessments were resolved through Taxpayer's subsequent CRS amendments. Although there remains a possibility, in reference to the assessments contained in Taxpayer Exhibit 1, that the same periods could be subject to audit or re-assessment, Taxpayer's outstanding liability under those assessments, as of the date of the hearing, was zero.

Given the general rule that courts do not decide academic or moot questions, the Hearing Officer declines to address the issues raised by Taxpayer regarding the now fully-abated assessment, issued under Letter ID No. L0072396592, or other assessments contained in Taxpayer Exhibit 1 which were resolved through Taxpayer's subsequent CRS amendments. With respect to those particular assessments, Taxpayer has not identified any form of relief the Hearing Officer can now afford, which the abatement and amended returns, have not already afforded. *See Crutchfield v. N.M. Dep't of Taxation & Revenue*, 2005-NMCA-022, ¶36, 137 N.M. 26, 106 P.3d 1273 ("A reviewing court generally does not decide academic or moot questions."); *See State v. Ordunez*, 2012-NMSC-024, ¶22, 283 P.3d 282 ("It is not within the province of an appellate court to decide abstract, hypothetical or moot questions in cases wherein no actual relief can be afforded."

(alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)).

The only outstanding issue is whether Taxpayer should be entitled to protest any Department action, particularly notices of assessment issued before June 23, 2018, because Taxpayer's protest of September 21, 2018, could not be timely as to any action before that date.

Under the evidence presented in this protest, the starting point is to simply recognize that the relevant assessments and notices are entitled to the presumption of administrative regularity. *See Wing Pawn Shop v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't*, 1991-NMCA-024, ¶29, 111 N.M. 735. Taxpayer did not present evidence or argument directed at rebutting that presumption.

The next fact to recognize is that upon mailing the assessments dated April 20, 2016 and September 1, 2017, the Department acquired the rebuttable presumption that those assessments were correct under NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-17 (C). Consequently, a taxpayer's burden upon effectuating a timely protest, is to overcome the presumption that the assessments are correct. *See Archuleta v. O'Cheskey*, 1972-NMCA-165, ¶11, 84 N.M. 428.

If a taxpayer is to preserve its opportunity to rebut the presumption of correctness, then that right must be asserted within 90 days of the assessment by filing a written protest with the secretary of the Department. *See* NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-24. In pertinent part, Section 7-1-24 (C) (emphasis added), establishes that such protest "shall be filed within ninety days of the date of the mailing to or service upon the taxpayer by the department[.]" Use of "shall" imposes an unqualified prerequisite that the protest must be filed within 90-days. *See Marbob Energy Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm'n*, 2009-NMSC-013, ¶22, 146 N.M. 24 (use of the word "shall" in a statute indicates a provision is mandatory absent clear indication to the contrary).

Under Regulation 3.1.7.11 NMAC, the 90-day protest deadline is jurisdictional, and because Department regulations interpreting a statute are presumed proper, they are to be given substantial

weight. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State ex rel. Dep't of Taxation & Revenue, 2006-NMCA-50, ¶16, 139 N.M. 498.

It is also well-established by long-standing precedent that the failure to adhere to a statutory deadline to protest Department action forms a jurisdictional bar to protest. Approximately 70 years ago in *Associated Petroleum Transp. v. Shepard*, 1949-NMSC-002, ¶6 & ¶11, 53 N.M. 52, the New Mexico Supreme Court observed that a taxpayer's failure to adhere to a deadline, as it existed at the time relevant to that case, deprived the State's taxing authority of jurisdiction over a protest, and our courts have maintained that interpretation of the law ever since.

More recently, the New Mexico Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of a property taxpayer's complaints for refund when it determined that the complaints were not timely filed in compliance with statutory deadlines. *See Chan v. Montoya*, 2011-NMCA-72, 150 N.M. 44.

In another example observed in *Lopez v. New Mexico Dep't of Taxation & Revenue*, 1997-NMCA-115, 124 N.M. 270, the Court of Appeals considered whether a taxpayer timely and properly filed a protest against a notice of audit, in which a tax hearing officer determined that the protest was untimely under Section 7-1-24 (which then required a protest within 30-days rather than 90-days under the current statute). *See Lopez*, 1997-NMCA-115, ¶6. The Court of Appeals noted in that case that Section 7-1-24 imposed a strict time restriction on a protest and affirmed that hearing officer's conclusion that the taxpayer did not timely protest the Department's audit, but not before searching the record for the sorts of communications that might arguably be construed as a timely protest.

The Hearing Officer engaged in a similar analysis, and determined that Taxpayer had until Tuesday, July 19, 2016, to protest the assessment dated April 20, 2016 under Letter ID No. L0593455664, and until Thursday, November 30, 2017, to protest the assessment dated September

1, 2017 under Letter ID No. L2142842160. Taxpayer, however, did neither, and although Taxpayer presents a compilation of emails in which he discussed various matters relating to his potential liabilities, a careful review of those email reveals a chronological pattern that the Hearing Officer finds to be enlightening and dispositive. That review revealed that all emails in reference to the 2016 and 2017 assessments were either pre-assessment, or long after the applicable 90-day deadline.

The evidence illustrated that Taxpayer exchanged a handful of *pre-assessment* emails with Mr. Montalvo between December 21, 2015 and April 18, 2016 in reference to Case No. 679751, which eventually resulted in the assessment issued under Letter ID No. L0593455664. Mr. Montalvo's final communication to Taxpayer was on April 18, 2016, two days prior to the assessment, and stated in relevant part, "I have made those adjustments to the case. I certainly understand your frustrations and I encourage you to exercise your protest rights. I have assessed the case. Soon you will receive the notice in the mail." [Taxpayer Ex. 12.14]

The assessment was dated two days later on April 20, 2016, and 90 days from the date appearing on the face of the assessment was Tuesday, July 19, 2016. There were no further communications until October 21, 2016, when Taxpayer attempted to reach Mr. Montalvo to obtain a copy of the notice subject of Mr. Montalvo's last pre-assessment email. Taxpayer, at that time, explained that "[he] misplaced the notice." [Taxpayer Ex. 12.17]

After receiving an automatic reply that Mr. Montalvo was no longer employed with the Department, Taxpayer contacted Ms. Kathryn Jost, and once again explained that he misplaced "the notice" and needed to obtain a copy. [Taxpayer Ex. 12.18 – 12.19] To the extent any of these communications could be construed as a protest, which they cannot, they occurred 184 days after the assessment under Letter ID No. L0593455664, well after the 90-day protest deadline. It is also helpful to note that they also pre-dated any other assessments or notices potentially relevant to this

protest.

silence.

Even if it were abundantly clear from the pre-assessment communications with Mr.

Montalvo, that Taxpayer did not agree with the Department's position, it was not reasonable for him

to assume that his pre-assessment contentions would preserve his post-assessment right of protest.

Instead, Taxpayer's post-assessment conduct as established by the evidence is best described as

Next, the record reveals a gap of more than nine months before Taxpayer again exchanged a variety of *pre-assessment* emails with Ms. Marquez on August 30, 2017 and August 31, 2017. Those emails referenced Case No. 717898 which eventually resulted in the assessment issued under Letter ID No. L2142842160. On August 31, 2017, Ms. Marquez explained the procedure she intended to employ in reference to Case No. 717898 and said, "[o]nce the case is assessed a notice of amount due will be mailed, this will have contact information for customer service to discuss possible payment arrangements and Protest Rights." [Taxpayer Ex. 14.6]

The resulting assessment was issued the very next day, on September 1, 2017. The deadline to protest that assessment, being 90 days from the date of the assessment, was Thursday, November 30, 2017. Yet the record contains no further communications between September 1, 2017 and November 30, 2017 specific to this assessment, including any communications that could be construed as a protest of that assessment. [Taxpayer Exs. 11, 12, 14, 16, 17]

The next recorded series of communications commenced with Department auditor, Lara Gage, on March 23, 2018 in reference to Case No. 912788, which did not correlate directly with either assessment from 2016 or 2017, but even if they had, were already well-past due if intended to be construed as a formal protest. Instead, communications were once again, *pre-assessment* communications, presumably regarding the series of assessments that would eventually be issued in

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June and July of 2018, and which for the purpose of this protest, are now moot.

Then, on July 5, 2018, Taxpayer emailed Ms. Jessica McParlin and explained that his intentions to protest should have always been obvious, but that various employees with whom he had communicated "did not forward those protests to the protest division to set up a hearing." Even if Taxpayer's email of July 5, 2018 were to be liberally construed as a protest of the assessments issued under Letter ID Nos. L0593455664 and L2142842160, the deadlines that attached to those assessments had long since passed, and the assessments were already presumed correct and final. There was no jurisdiction to challenge their correctness at that time, or now. See Associated Petroleum Transp., 1949-NMSC-002, ¶6; Lopez, 1997-NMCA-115, ¶6.

Similar to the scenario that arose in *Lopez*, where that taxpayer also argued that he preserved his right to protest by filing actual or constructive notices, the Hearing Officer searched the record and found no basis upon which to find that any communication might qualify as a timely protest. Instead, the chronology clearly reveals that all 2016 and 2017 communications were either preassessment or long after the 90-day deadline had passed, not by mere days, but by months.

In the light most favorable to Taxpayer, his June or July 2018 communications could have represented valid protests as to the Notice of Lien dated May 26, 2018 [Taxpayer Ex. 9] or the Final Notice Before Seizure dated May 31, 2018 [Taxpayer Ex. 10]. However, by that time, there would be no jurisdiction to protest the underlying assessments, and Taxpayer's email did not raise any technical challenges to the Department's enforcement procedure. See e.g. Lopez, 1997-NMCA-115, ¶6 - ¶10.

In other words, if Taxpayer's emails from June or July of 2018 could be construed as protests, then they would only be timely as to the Department's collection activities, and would be limited to whether the Department had adhered to the technical requirements for collecting the previously assessed outstanding liabilities, not whether the underlying liability was erroneous. *See e.g. In the Matter of the Protest of Eunice Sports Broadcasting*, D&O No. 17-32 (non-precedential).

Yet, Taxpayer never raised such a technical challenge, whether by email in June or July of 2018, in his September 21, 2018 protest, in any pre-hearing statement, or at the hearing on the merits. Therefore, if communications with Ms. McParlin in June or July of 2018 can be construed as a protest, then it would only be valid to the issue of whether the Department's collection activities were procedurally or technically correct. However, Taxpayer presented no evidence or argument on that issue and the Hearing Officer observed nothing irregular on the face of either the Notice of Intent to Lien or the Final Notice Before Seizure.

Taxpayer nevertheless presents an assortment of arguments that, if accepted, might either: (1) enlarge the deadline for filing a protest under Section 7-1-24; or (2) relax the requirements of initiating a formal protest so that virtually any email communication, which could be construed as challenging the Department, could be regarded as a "protest."

Taxpayer's protest, at Taxpayer Exhibit 2.1, states "[Taxpayer] believes that due to communications with [the Department] covering an extended period of time, that the [Taxpayer] has through constructive notice to [the Department] preserved the ability to appeal beyond the three year [sic] period of assessments." (Emphasis in Original)

Communications, as claimed by Taxpayer, can essentially be separated into two categories. The first category represents "demands" or "assessments" which are initiated by the Department. Taxpayer argues that "demands" and "assessments" need not be formal, as in a Notice of Assessment of Taxes and Demand for Payment, but they can also be informal.

The second category represents "protests" which Taxpayer similarly asserts need not be formal but can be asserted through an email in which Taxpayer's disagreement with a Department

"Demands" and "Assessments"

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The terms "demand" and "assessment" are significant to Taxpayer because according to the Department's website, as observed in the last sentence of Taxpayer Exhibit 6, "[a] taxpayer must make a protest within 90 days of the mailing date of a tax assessment, of the mailing or service of another notice or *demand*, or of the date of filing or mailing of a tax return[.]" (Emphases Added)

Therefore, Taxpayer fundamentally asserts that any correspondence, including casual emails, could be construed as a "demand" or "assessment" depending on the substance of the communication. Therefore, according to Taxpayer, an informal email from the Department, if making reference to an assessment, could be construed as a new "demand" or "assessment", affording a new 90-day protest period.

Taxpayer's position might best be illustrated through example. Thus, if on day 89 after issuance of a Notice of Assessment, a taxpayer exchanges emails with Department personnel regarding issues underlying the assessment, then the 90-day deadline should begin anew from that date, presuming the communication did not resolve the underlying assessment because the Department's failure to concede to a taxpayer's position is essentially equivalent to a new "demand" or "assessment."

Taxpayer argues that "demand" should be defined broadly and encourages the Hearing Officer to refer to 45 CFR Section 30.11 (b). However, the Hearing Officer is unpersuaded by Taxpayer's reference to that regulation for a variety of reasons, one of which is that it is a federal regulation which has no correlation to the implementation of any New Mexico tax law. Second is that the regulation does not even address taxation issues. Instead, it addresses procedures for the collection of debts owed to a federal agency, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,

and in no way associates to the collection of taxes, even at the federal level.

NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-24 is the controlling statute. Section 7-1-24 (A) (1) provides that "[a] taxpayer may dispute: (1) the *assessment* to the taxpayer of any amount of tax." In circumstances where a taxpayer wishes to avail themselves of the opportunity to dispute an assessment, as provided in Section 7-1-24 (A) (1), then Section 7-1-24 (B) provides that "[t]he taxpayer may dispute a matter ... by filing with the secretary a written protest."

The term, "assessment," is critical. The Legislature has assigned the term specific significance under Section 7-1-17 (B) (2) where it prescribes the prerequisites of an effective assessment of taxes. It provides that "[a]ssessments of tax are effective: (2) when a document denominated 'notice of assessment of taxes', issued in the name of the secretary, is mailed or delivered in person to the taxpayer against whom the liability for tax is asserted, stating the nature and amount of the taxes assertedly owed by the taxpayer to the state, demanding of the taxpayer the immediate payment of the taxes and briefly informing the taxpayer of the remedies available to the taxpayer[.]" Assessments, as required by the statute must contain a "demand" for payment.

Yet, Taxpayer insists that informal emails between himself and Department personnel should be construed as "assessments" or "demands" so that the 90-day protest period should run from the dates of those communications, all subsequent to the formal notices of assessment remaining for consideration in this protest.

Taxpayer misunderstands the law, and if his interpretation were implemented, would have absurd results. For example, under Taxpayer's construction of the law, the Department would be encouraged to *cease all communications* for a period not less than 90 days in order for an assessment to become final, meaning that an assessed taxpayer wishing to discuss an assessment with the Department would be met with silence. However, the New Mexico Taxpayer Bill of Rights, NMSA

1	1978, Section 7-1-4.2 requires, among other obligations, that the Department communicate with a
2	taxpayer regarding the basis for an assessment. See NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-4.2 (F). Yet, refusing
3	to communicate with an assessed taxpayer, for the purpose of assuring that an assessment becomes
4	final, obliviates the stated purpose of the Legislature when it codified those very same rights. NMSA
5	1978, Section 7-1-4.1 provides:
6 7	The "New Mexico Taxpayer Bill of Rights" is created. It is the purpose of the New Mexico Taxpayer Bill of Rights to:
8 9 10 11	A. ensure that the rights of New Mexico taxpayers are adequately safeguarded and protected during the assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax administered by the department pursuant to the Tax Administration Act;
12	B. ensure that the taxpayer is treated with dignity and respect; and
13 14 15	C. provide brief but comprehensive statements that explain in simple, nontechnical terms the rights of taxpayers as set forth in Section 7-1-4.2 NMSA 1978.
16	New Mexico courts have also been clear with regard for the manner in which agencies of
17	the State should be expected to behave and have previously avoided construing statutes in a manner
18	that would encourage State agencies to simply disregard or ignore constituent matters as a legitimate
19	method of conducting State business. In the context of considering the timeliness of a claim for
20	refund, the Court of Appeals has stated in response to a similar argument, "[w]e decline to encourage
21	a state agency to behave in this fashion. It makes far more sense for the Department to be able to
22	respond[.]" See Kilmer v. Goodwin, 2004-NMCA-122, ¶21, 136 N.M. 440, 99 P.3d 690.
23	If on the other hand, the Department were to communicate freely as contemplated by the
24	Legislature, then the protest period might remain open indefinitely. This result, however, is also
25	absurd. Again, although not necessarily within the context of assessments, Kilmer, 2004-NMCA-
26	122, ¶16, explained that the purpose of deadlines is to "avoid stale claims, which protect the
27	Department's ability to stabilize and predict, with some degree of certainty, the funds it collects or

manages." The same rationale similarly applies to the Department's efforts to collect assessed taxes.

The law does not intend for an informal email, in which the Department expresses disagreement with the position of a taxpayer, with concern for an assessment, to extend the statutory deadline for protesting that same assessment. Deadlines are firmly established by Section 7-1-24, which in the cases of Letter ID Nos. L2142842160 and L0593455664, lapsed well before the earliest email that might liberally be construed as a protest. *See e.g. In the Matter of the Protest of Robert G. Hooper*, D&O No. 16-20 (non-precedential).

Even if Taxpayer nevertheless intended to protest some other general matter, such as an email suggesting that the Department has not conceded to his arguments, then the Hearing Officer continues to remain unpersuaded. Although Section 7-1-24 (A) (2) allows a taxpayer to protest the application of any provision of the Tax Administration Act, except the issuance of a subpoena or summons, there is no this authority for construing that section to provide a second opportunity to protest the merits of an assessment when the 90-day period for such a protest has clearly lapsed.

A general rule of statutory construction provides that a specific provision applies over a general provision in the same subject matter. *See Hi-Country Buick GMC, Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't of N.M.*, 2016-NMCA-027, ¶21. Thus, with respect to challenging an assessment, which is specifically listed under Section 7-1-24 (A) (1), Taxpayer had 90-days to file his protest. The more general provision under Section 7-1-24 (A) (2) does not revive the 90-day period to protest the merits of an underlying assessment.

Construing Section 7-1-24 (A) (2) as permitting Taxpayer to challenge a previously unprotested assessment, merely because Taxpayer exchanged a post-assessment email with someone from the Department past the 90-day deadline would lead to absurd results, in similar vein to the scenarios discussed previously. Moreover, such construction would create discord with other

Incidentally, the Hearing Officer notes that Taxpayer's formal protest makes an intriguing statement, which shines an alternate light on the reason that Taxpayer may not have protested the assessments under Letter ID Nos. L2142842160 and L0593455664 within the 90 days allotted for filing a protest. At Taxpayer Exhibit 2.1, Taxpayer explained that his communications with the Department "preserved the ability to appeal beyond the three-year period of assessments." This statement suggests that the Taxpayer may have simply misunderstood the law by presuming that the protest deadline were three years instead of 90 days.

Although sympathetic to such error, *if* that is what occurred in this case, each assessment was accompanied by a notice of Taxpayer's rights under the law, and Taxpayer had actual notice of the relevant deadlines for disputing the assessed liabilities.

"Protests"

The next issue to consider, in the alternative, is whether any electronic communications from Taxpayer, earlier than September 21, 2018, might satisfy the elements of a valid, written protest. Taxpayer proffered ACD-31094 Rev. 5/15 [Taxpayer Ex. 5] for the proposition that his electronic communications encapsulated the basic information required of any formal written protest, and argued that his emails satisfied the essential elements of notice, relying heavily on the provisions of

The assessments under Letter ID Nos. L0593455664 and L2142842160 direct Taxpayer to review an enclosed publication, entitled *FYI-406: Your Rights Under the Tax Laws*. The same publication is similarly referenced in Taxpayer Exhibit 6, and clearly states:

To protest an assessment, file a written protest within 90 days of the date of the assessment. Mail your protest to: New Mexico Department of Taxation and Revenue, Protest Office, P.O. Box 1671, Santa Fe, NM 87504-1671. If using a private carrier, the street address is 1100 S. St. Francis Drive, Suite 1100, Santa Fe, NM 87505. The protest must state the taxpayer's name and identifying number (Social Security Number for individuals; New Mexico CRS number or Federal Employer Identification Number for businesses), letter identification number if applicable, the amount and kind of tax you are protesting, grounds for protest, a summary statement of the evidence you expect to produce to support each ground asserted, and the affirmative relief you want.

Not only were Taxpayer's emails untimely with concern for the 2016 and 2017 assessments, but Taxpayer's email communications failed to adhere to the Department's published instructions on how and where to file a protest, which were not only provided to Taxpayer along with the assessments, but which were also readily accessible to Taxpayer as demonstrated from a review of his own exhibits. Taxpayer had actual notice that a protest needed to be mailed as instructed in *FYI-406*, above.

In addition to the observations concerning the timeliness of the emails, it was also not reasonable for Taxpayer to rely on his email correspondence to Department personnel, who were not affiliated with the protest office, to perfect a valid formal protest of the 2016 and 2017 assessments. As discussed previously, the record illustrates how all emails were *pre-assessment*, or several months after the 90-day protest deadline had already expired.

Furthermore, a thorough review of Taxpayer's own exhibits tends to demonstrate his understanding that email communications would not be regarded as formal protests under Section 7-1-24. For example, if Taxpayer genuinely believed, on July 24, 2018, that email correspondence could initiate a formal protest of an assessment, then he would not have requested, as he did in Taxpayer Exhibit 11.17, verification of applicable dates while explaining his then-present intentions to "prepare the appeal," acknowledge that the assessments contain "appeal information[,]" and express interest for "where I need to file the appeal." Moreover, on August 16, 2018 in Taxpayer Exhibit 11.18, he would not have followed up stating "I don't want to miss my 90 day window, but also want to make sure that I have the information needed to file the appeal, and to whom I need to send it." Finally, he would not have, on September 21, 2018 in Taxpayer Exhibit 11.19, explained that his appeal "didn't just do the personal assessment, but submitted on all my arguments." This final statement suggests to the Hearing Officer that Taxpayer recognized that his protests in reference to the 2016 and 2017 assessments would be untimely, but that he would nevertheless present them as if they were timely because he perceived himself as having nothing to lose by trying.

It was not evident that Taxpayer ever intended for his pre-assessment email communications to be regarded as formal protests of subsequent assessments under Section 7-1-24. But even if those were his intentions, and even if he were entitled to essentially pre-protest a potential assessment, the Department had not implemented any procedure for any protests to be filed by email. Taxpayer argued that the distinction between mail and email is immaterial, explaining that "email" contains the word "mail" in its title. The Hearing Officer finds Taxpayer's reasoning to be unpersuasive.

It is accurate that email has supplanted traditional mail for many purposes, and the Department provides a variety of services by electronic means. However, the Department has not yet implemented a standard procedure for accepting protests by email. Although the Department

could afford any taxpayer an alternative filing method on a case-by-case basis, such as email or facsimile, there is insufficient evidence to establish that occurred in this case, and Taxpayer clearly did not adhere to the standard procedure with concern for any purported protest prior to September 21, 2018.

Taxpayer's first and only formal protest was mailed on or about September 21, 2018 and received by the Department's Protest Office on September 24, 2018, well beyond the deadlines for protesting Letter ID Nos. L2142842160 and L0593455664, or any other Department action prior to June 23, 2018.

Statutory or Equitable Estoppel

Taxpayer claims that the Department should be estopped from disputing the timeliness of his protest, relying on email communications, particularly with Ms. Denise Marquez stating that "she went and made major, blanket statements that were designed to prevent me from going any further." [Record of Hearing, 3/27/2019 (Taxpayer's Closing Argument)]

However, a review of all of Taxpayer's evidence, including Taxpayer Exhibit 14, containing communications with Ms. Marquez, fails to reveal any communications which might suggest that estoppel should apply. There are two forms of estoppel that are relevant for discussion.

The first form of estoppel is statutory. NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-60 (1993) provides for statutory estoppel in certain circumstances, particularly when a taxpayer's actions were "in accordance with any regulation effective during the time the asserted liability for tax arose or in accordance with any ruling addressed to the party personally and in writing by the secretary..." The evidence presented in this protest did not establish that the Taxpayer's actions, at any time relevant to the issues in protest, were in accordance with any regulation effective during the time the asserted liability arose, or in accordance with any ruling addressed to Taxpayer personally in writing by the

Taxpayer's argument may also be construed as asserting a claim for equitable estoppel. However, the availability of equitable estoppel for providing the relief Taxpayer seeks is uncertain in an administrative protest hearing. See AA Oilfield Service v. New Mexico State Corporation Commission, 1994-NMSC-085, ¶18, 118 N.M. 273 (equitable remedies are not part of the "quasi-judicial" powers of administrative agencies). Even if it were available in this context, courts are reluctant to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel against the state in cases involving the assessment and collection of taxes. See Taxation & Revenue Dep't v. Bien Mur Indian Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 1989-NMSC-015, ¶9, 108 N.M. 22. In such cases, estoppel applies only pursuant to statute or when "right and justice demand it." See Bien Mur Indian Market, 1989-NMSC-015, ¶9.

In order for Taxpayer to establish an equitable estoppel claim against the Department, the taxpayer must show that (1) the government knew the facts; (2) the government intended its conduct to be acted upon or so acted that plaintiffs had the right to believe it was so intended; (3) plaintiffs must have been ignorant of the true facts; and (4) plaintiffs reasonably relied on the government's conduct to their injury. *See Kilmer*, 2004-NMCA-122, ¶26.

Finally, Taxpayer must also show "affirmative misconduct on the part of the government." *See Kilmer*, 2004-NMCA-122, ¶26. In this protest, there is simply no evidence to suggest affirmative misconduct by any employee of the Department with whom Taxpayer may have communicated at any time relevant to this protest, including Ms. Marquez. Nor is there any other evidence to establish any of the other elements of equitable estoppel.

Moreover, it is well established that even if Taxpayer produces a written communication in which he could infer that his 90-day window for filing a protest had been extended, that estoppel cannot lie against the state when the act sought would be contrary to the requirements expressed by

¹ Letter ID Nos. L0387657520; L1729834800; L0656092976; L1192963888; L0253439792; L1998270256; L0924528432; L1461399344; and L1027292976. [Taxpayer Exhibit 1.1 – 1.9]; Letter ID No. L0072396592 [Administrative File]

1	and received by its Protest Office on September 24, 2018, is not timely in reference to any protestable		
2	action occurring more than 90 days prior to the date it was mailed, or before June 23, 2018, including		
3	Letter ID Nos. L2142842160 and L0593455664. See NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-24; Associate		
4	Petroleum Transp. v. Shepard, 1949-NMSC-002, ¶6 & ¶11, 53 N.M. 52; Chan v. Montoya, 2011		
5	NMCA-72, 150 N.M. 44; Lopez v. New Mexico Dep't of Taxation & Revenue, 1997-NMCA-115,		
6	124 N.M. 270.		
7	D. Taxpayer's email communications prior to submitting a written protest on September		
8	21, 2018, do not constitute timely or valid protests under Section 7-1-24; See also FYI-406; See		
9	NMSA 1978, Section 9-11-6.2 (G) ("Any regulation, ruling, instruction or order issued by the		
10	secretary or delegate of the secretary is presumed to be a proper implementation of the provisions		
11	of the laws that are charged to the department, the secretary, any division of the department or any		
12	director of any division of the department.")		
13	E. Taxpayer is not entitled to any relief in the form of statutory or equitable estoppel		
14	See Kilmer v. Goodwin, 2004-NMCA-122, 136 N.M. 440; See NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-60.		
15	Taxpayer's protest in reference to any Department action earlier than June 23, 2018 is		
16	untimely or unsupported by sufficient evidence, and his protest in reference to any Department		
17	actions on or after June 23, 2018 is moot. Taxpayer's protest IS DENIED.		
18	DATED: May 24, 2019		
19 20 21 22 23 24 25	Chris Romero Hearing Officer Administrative Hearings Office P.O. Box 6400 Santa Fe, NM 87502		

Pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-25 (2015), the parties have the right to appeal this decision by *filing a notice of appeal with the New Mexico Court of Appeals* within 30 days of the date shown above. If an appeal is not timely filed with the Court of Appeals within 30 days, this Decision and Order will become final. Rule of Appellate Procedure 12-601 NMRA articulates the requirements of perfecting an appeal of an administrative decision with the Court of Appeals. Either party filing an appeal shall file a courtesy copy of the appeal with the Administrative Hearings Office contemporaneous with the Court of Appeals filing so that the Administrative Hearings Office may begin preparing the record proper. The parties will each be provided with a copy of the record proper at the time of the filing of the record proper with the Court of Appeals, which occurs within 14-days of the Administrative Hearings Office receipt of the docketing statement from the appealing party. *See* Rule 12-209 NMRA.

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
2	On May 24, 2019, a copy of the foregoing Decision and Order was served on the parties listed		
3	below in the following manner::		
4 5	First Class Mail	Interdepartmental State Mail	
6 7	INTENTIONALLY BLANK		
8		John D. Griego	
9		Legal Assistant	
10		Administrative Hearings Office	
11		Post Office Box 6400	
12		Santa Fe, NM 87502	
13		PH: (505)827-0466	
14		FX: (505)827-9732	
15		john.griego1@state.nm.us	